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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
Rae Lynn Jones (12/28/71)
Robert William Jones (07/27/74)
James Robert Jones, Jr. (02/07/76)

RESPONDENTS'
BRIEF ON APPEAL
Case No. 18189

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE ·
The appellant appeals from the Judgment of the Second
District Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, presiding, granting the
petition of respondent James Robert Jones to terminate the
parental rights of appellant, Vina Rae Jones Patereau, in the
above-named children.

All parental rights of appellant in said

children were terminated by order of the juvenile court on
grounds of abandonment pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated section 78-3a-48(1)(b) (Supp. 1981).

The court then

ordered legal custody of the children vested in LDS Social
Services for adoptive placement.

The court found that appellant,

the children's mother, had abandoned the children in that her
conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for her parental
obligations and that this disregard had led to the destruction of
the parent-child relationship.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The Second District Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, presiding, after trial
entered an order permanently terminating all parental rights of
appellant, on the·grounds that· her conduct indicated that she had
abandoned the children.

The matter was before the juvenile court

on the petition of the children's father, respondent James Robert
Jones.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judqment of the
juvenile court, while appellant seeks reversal of that judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant, Vina Rae Jones Patereau, is the natural mother of
the three children:

Rae Lynn Jones, born December 28, 1971;

Robert William Jones, born July 27, 1974; and James Robert Jones,
Jr., born February 7, 1976 (hereinafter "children").
James Robert Jones is the father of the children.
respondent separated in April of 1977.

(R.2).

Respondent

Appellant and

Appellant took

the children with her when she separated from respondent, but was
unable to arrange for their care.

She returned the children to

respondent after a few days. (R.17).

-2-
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Appellant and respondent were divorced on April 30, 1978, at
the instance of respondent, approximately one year after
appellant had left respondent.

The decree of divorce awarded

respondent custody of the children and required appellant to pay
$15 per month per child in support for the children.

Respondent

cared for the children from April, 1977, a few days after the
parties' separation, until they were placed in foster care
through LDS Social Services in December, 1980. (R.8-9).
Appellant did not,assist in the financial support of the
children, either during the separation or after the divorce.
(R.5).

During the entire period commencing with the separation

and continuing after the divorce until the present {over four
years time), appellant visited the children only four or five
times.

Her most recent visit with the children, which was for a

weekend, took place in February, 1980.

(R.9-10).

Since prior to the separation of the parties, respondent has
continuously had the same place of employment and has always
resided within a few miles of appellant.

He and the children

were accessible to appellant at his work place and through his
relatives with whom she was acquainted.

(R.4).

No written

communications were received by the children from appellant after
the parties' separation.
children.
birthdays.

Appellant also failed to telephone the

She even ignored them at Christmas and on their
She never sent them presents nor asked about their

health or happiness either by telephone or by letter. (R.5).
In the fall of 1980, respondent requested assistance from
LDS Social Services in selecting and monitoring a suitable foster
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home for the children.

He sought to place the children in foster

care because he was having difficulty arranging baby sitters and
felt that frequently changing sitters was harmful to them.

They

were formally placed in foster care in December of 1980. (R.6).
Prior to making the foster care arrangement, respondent
sought to counsel with appellant, but she refused to discuss the
matter with him except in the hostile·company of her new husband
and her mother-in-law.

(R.7).

Soon thereafter, appellant

apparently learned of the children's placement in foster care,
but she took no action with respect to their placement until
August of 1981. {R.22, 52).
Respondent and his counsel were unable to locate appellant
in order to serve upon her the petition for an order of permanent
deprivation of parental rights.
in "The Salt Lake Tribune".

Thus, the summons was published

Only then did respondent contact LDS

Social Services, although no mention of that agency was made in
the published summons.

(R.54, 104).

After several continuances granted by the court in order to
permit appellant to engage counsel and to allow her to assist him
in the preparation of her defense, the petition of respondent to
terminate the parental rights of appellant was finally tried in
juvenile court on October 23, 1981.

An order permanently

depriving appellant of parental rights in the children was
entered November 30, 1981.

The children were adopted by their

foster parents on December 21, 1981.
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ARGUMENT

POINT NO. I

THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING OF
ABANDONMENT UNLESS THERE IS A CLEAR SHOWING OF ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
This court has repeatedly declared that a trial judge's
finding of abandonment should be upheld unless there is a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion.

The general rule consistently

applied by this court in appellate review is that the findings of
the trial judge are to be given great weight because of his or
her opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.

This

court has also held that it will presume that the trier of fact
believed those aspects of the evidence which support the findings
and judgment being appealed.
In Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), this
court said that because of the trial court's advantage in judging
credibility, sensing personality, and hearing the facts first
hand, its judgment was to be upheld, even if reasonable minds
could differ.
[W]hether there has been an abandonment generally
depends upon the facts of each case; and where the
evidence is such that reasonable minds might differ
thereon, it is a question of fact which it is the
prerogative of the fact-trier to determine.

Ia.

at 112.
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This same conservative standard of review was affirmed one
year later in State in the Interest of S

J

H
J
, and s
J
, 576 P.2d 1280
--~~~~--------------:.-----------------------------(Utah 1978), when this court declared that it was well established
that the factual determinations of juvenile courts were "not to
be overturned absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion."
Id. at 1282.
In the most recent case of Adoption of McKinstray v.
McKinstry, 628 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1981), this court declared that
even though a strict evidentiary standard was required in
abandonment cases, the reasonable conclusions of trial courts
should not be interfered with.
Regardless of the strict evidentiary standard required
in an abandonment case, the issues in most instances,
including the present case, are factual, and as stated
in Hall v. Anderson, supra, "if the evidence is such
that reasonable minds may differ as to the conclusion
to be drawn therefrom, it is the prerogative of the
trier of facts to make the determination; and this
court should not interfere with that prerogative by
disagreeing with the determination thus made."
Id. at 1288.
Judge Whitmer's judgment in the case at hand was based upon
evidence and testimony regarding the appellant's parental conduct
over a four and one-half year period of time.

The judge's

finding that the appellant had abandoned her children is clearly
supported by the evidence and, thus, was within the prerogative
of the trier of fact.

The judgment was therefore not an abuse of

discretion and should be upheld.

-6-
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POINT NO. II
THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT OR COMMUNICATE WITH HER
CHILDREN MORE THAN FIVE TIMES IN OVER FOUR YEARS SATISFIES THIS
COURT'S DEFINITION OF ABANDONMENT.
In determining what conduct justifies a finding of abandonment, the applicable standard is an objective, as opposed to a
subjective, one.

This court has warned that it must be careful

to not focus too much attention on parent's wishful thoughts and
too little on their conduct.

State in the Interest of the

Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331

(Utah 1977).

Whether or not there has been an abandonment within the
meaning of the statute is to be determined objectively,
taking into account not only the verbal expressions of
the natural parents but their conduct as parents as
well. The subjective standard often focuses too much
attention on the parents' wishful thoughts and hopes
for the child and too little on the more important
element of how well the parents have discharged their
parental responsibility.
Id. at 334.
This caution is followed by an objective definition of
abandonment which consists of conduct on the part of the parent
which implies a "conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a
parent to the child, leading to the destruction of the parentchild relationship."

A.

Id.

The Finding of Abandonment Has B~en Upheld in
Cases S1m1lar to the Present One.

Adhering to the above-mentioned standard, this court has
upheld determinations of abandonment in cases similar to the
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present one.

A juvenile court's finding of abandonment was

affirmed in Summers Children, supra, where a father, who did not
have custody, had visited his children only twice in three years,
had indicated only a minimal interest in the welfare of his
children, and had demonstrated his inability to acquire a
suitable home for them.
In McKinstray, supra, this court upheld the district court's

finding that a father's failure to pay support for his children
for several years coupled with his failure to make more than
token efforts to communicate with them, all without good cause or
justification, constituted abandonment.
Rarely seeing her children for a period of over two years
was the principal fa.ct apparently justifying termination of
parental rights on the grounds of abandonment in State in the
Interest of A, 514 P.2d 797 (Utah 1973).
A district court finding of abandonment under Utah Code
Annotated section 78-30-5 (1953) was affirmed in Adoption of
Guzman, 586 P.2d 418 (Utah 1978).

The lower court had based its

decision on the mother's failure, over a four year period, to
exercise her rights of visitation and on her failure to
communicate with her children and her former husband.
In addition to the guidelines contained in the decisions of
this court, the Utah Legislature has established statutory
presumptions of abandonment.

Although the appellant did not have

legal custody of the children and termination was accomplished by
the juvenile court rather than as part of the adoption proceedings, so that neither of these presumptions is strictly applicable, they nevertheless are still instructive.
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The Legislature has determined that parents having legal
custody who surrender physical custody of the child for a period
of six months and do not, during that period of time, manifest a
firm intention to resume care or make arrangements for the care
of the child, shall be presumed to have abandoned the child. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-48(1)(b)(Supp. 1981).

Abandonment of a child

shall also be found in adoption proceedings before the district
court when a parent without good cause has not provided support
and has made no effort or only token effort to maintain a
parental relationship with the child.

A rebuttable presumption

that no effort has been made exists if the parent has failed to
support and communicate with the child for a period of one year
or longer.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-5(1953).

In light of the cases and instructive statutory presumptions
cited, appellant could easily have been found by clear and
convincing evidence to have abandoned her children. She visited
them no more than four or five times over a period of almost four
and one half years.

She did not support them financially

although she was apparently able-bodied and employable.

She gave

them no gifts on birthdays or Christmas, nor did she write or
call them on any occasion.

On those few occasions when she

inquired aboui visiting the children, she did not ask about their
health or happiness.

Appellant's actions show a consistent

pattern of ignoring the children and their welfare for almost
four and one-half years.
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B.

Cases Where Abandonment Has Not Been Found Are
Different From This Case.

~actually

Specific cases cited in appellant's brief may be
distinguished from the instant case.
The Robertson case, supra, is cited by appellant as one in
which termination of parental rights was not ordered despite a
mother's lack of contact with her children for nearly five years.
In that case, however, the mother, who lived out-of-state, was
involved in a serious automobile accident in which she sustained
multiple injuries including several broken bones.

As a result

she was hospitalized and received extensive and expensive medical
treatment.

This court apparently considered these extenuating

circumstances as justification for such lack of contact and
affirmed the district court's ruling.
In Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977), a father's
lack of visitation with, and support of, his daughter were
excused because he had undergone a serious back operation and had
thus been unemployed during all but five or six months of the
four years involved and because he had written his daughter
numerous times while he was incapacitated.
This court affirmed the district court's ruling with this
language:
On the basis of what has been said herein and
applying the rules of review as set forth in
the Robertson case referred to above, it is
our opinion that the evidence is not so clear
and persuasive that the defendant had deserted and abandoned his child that we would
upset the refusal of the trial court to so
Eind.
Id. at 1251.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

Appellant's reliance on the Summers case, supra, is
misplaced.

The Utah Supreme Court merely affirmed the decision

of the juvenile court, which rejected a subjective standard in
abandonment cases.
In State in the Interest of E. and B. v. J. T., 578 P.2d 831
(Utah 1978), cited by appellant, this court reversed the juvenile
court decision terminating a mother's parental rights.

The main

!

ground for reversal according to the opinion was that the
Division of Family Services had frustrated the mother's efforts
to regain-custody of her children.

No such frustration is

evidenced in the instant case.
Appellant cites State in the Interest of A, supra,
apparently for the proposition that termination is justified by a
showing that the effort put forth by a mother to visit her
children was "practically nil," unlike the efforts of appellant.
It should be noted, however, that the cited case involved a
mother who had legal custody but was deprived of physical custody
by Division of Family Services because she neglected her
children.

The abandonment occurred when "she failed to manifest

a firm intention to resume custody of her children for over two
years" after they had been taken by the state on grounds of
neglect.
Similarly, appellant notes that this court upheld an order
of the juvenile court that terminated a father's parental rights
in McKinstray, supra, but contrasts that father's failure to pay
child support for six years despite his financial ability to do
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so, his moving from the city, and his failure to attempt to
locate his children with the facts in the instant case.

Appel-

lant fails to mention several mitigating factors in the cited
~'

case,

that the children and the custodial parent had moved

at least twice, one of the moves being out of state.

Also, that

the father in the cited case was on the road much of the time as
a truck driver, making it difficult for him to locate his
children.

Perhaps in this case, as in each of the above

mentioned cases where on appeal the lower court's decision was
affirmed, this court simply refused to substitute its own
judgment or its interpretation of the facts for that of the trial
court.

POINT NO. III

A GUARDIAN AD LITEM NEED NOT HAVE BEEN APPOINTED FOR AND ON
BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN IN ADVANCE OF TERMINATION OF APPELLANT'S
PARENTAL RIGHTS.
This point was not raised by appellant in the juvenile
court, and appellant is barred from raising it for the first time
on appeal.
Respondent agrees with appellant that the rights of the
children were seriously affected by the termination of
appellant's parental rights.

Respondent asserts, however, that

such affect on the children was positive.
Under Utah law a guardian ad litem must be appointed only in
cases where the infant is a party.

Otherwise such an appointment

is discretionary with the trial court.
-12-

U.R.C.P. 17(b).
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The children were not parties to the action.

If they were

not consulted as to their wishes in this case, as appellant urges
they should have been, it may well have been because of their
tender age.
In any event, it is difficult in this case to envision what
benefits could have been derived by appointment of a guardian,
let alone why such appointment would have been necessary.

This

was an action brought by one spouse to terminate the parental rights
of the other spouse in

th~ir

children.

These children had been

in a foster home for nearly a year under the supervision of both
a state licensed child-placing agency and of the juvenile court.
The failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children
was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this
case.
CONCLUSION

Judge Whitmer's finding that the appellant abandoned her
children was based upon testimony and evidence that the appellant
had not supported her children nor communicated with them more
than five times in almost four and one half years.
of abandonment was both clear and convincing.

The evidence

The judgment of

the juvenile court should therefore be affirmed.
Dated this 19th day of May, 1982.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL

by

-tl;t~11

Allen

'-M.

..._,

!;1

!)

p / (_J10,/\--:<'

Swan

84111
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